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Game Theoretic Antibody Design

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Introduction


- Infectious diseases: major threat to public health
- Vaccines: major prevention tools
 - Vaccine evokes immune response
 - Immune system generates antibodies that kill the vaccine
- Common computational approaches involve two steps:
 - Finding an antibody with the desired characteristics
 - Finding a vaccine which binds to the desired antibody, thereby invoking the target immune response

Antibodies and Viruses

- Antibodies and viruses: proteins
 - Chain of 20 possible amino acids
 - Primary structure

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- These proteins bind at specific binding sites
 - By binding, an antibody neutralizes the virus
- Major challenge is virus escape through mutations e.g., HIV has extremely high mutation rates



Goals in Antibody Design

- Antibody should bind (and thereby neutralize)
 - A diverse array of target viruses
 - Potential mutations from the target viruses

Our Contributions

- A game theoretic (Stackelberg game) model for antibody and virus interaction
 - Bi-level optimization problem: intractable with integer variables
- To address intractability, we
 - Learn a linear approximation of the antibody-virus energy score
 - Formulate the optimal virus escape problem as an integer linear program (ILP)
 - Relax the integrality constraint in the ILP and take its dual to formulate the antibody design bi-level problem as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP)

Related Work

- Game-theoretic (Stackelberg Games) for Vaccine Design
Panda, Vorobeychik, AAMAS 2015
 - Relies on local search approaches whereas our compact formulation computes the optimal solution
- Computational protein design: Multi-specificity design with respect to more than one targets
Sevy et al., PLOS Computational Biology 2018
 - Breadth Optimization in Antibody Design (BROAD): machine learning and sequence optimization for efficient sampling in the sequence space
 - BROAD maximizes breadth over an existing virus panel whereas our approach additionally considers potential mutations

Game Theoretic Model

- We model the interaction between an antibody and a virus as a Stackelberg game
 - Antibody acts first (leader), choosing a sequence **a**
 - Virus (follower) observes the sequence **a**, and responds to it by choosing a sequence **v** so as to escape binding to **a**

Virus Objective

- Evade the antibody a through a series of mutations (l_0 distance) from native (initial) virus \mathbf{c} (T sequences)

Over the set of

feasible sequences

$$\text{maximize}_{\mathbf{v}^t \in \mathcal{V}} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{Z}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{v}^t) \quad \text{Z-score: binding and stability scores combined}$$

$$\text{subject to } \|\mathbf{v}^t - \mathbf{c}^t\|_0 = \alpha, \forall t.$$

Number of mutations

- We constrain the feasible mutations to those that are observed in nature, using mutation frequencies from an exhaustive database

Antibody Objective

- Minimize the energy score to strengthen binding (and stability), accounting for potential mutations

$$\min_{\mathbf{a} \in \mathcal{A}} \max_{\mathbf{v}^t \in \mathcal{V}} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{Z}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{v}^t)$$

subject to $\|\mathbf{v}^t - \mathbf{c}^t\|_0 = \alpha, \forall t$

- We restrict the antibody and virus design space to the binding sites in the native sequences
- We use Rosetta protein structure modeling software to determine the energy score

Bi-Linear Energy Score Model

- We approximate the complex black-box Rosetta energy function by a bi-linear function of the antibody and virus sequences
- The assumption is that the binding and stability of an antibody-virus complex is primarily determined by
 - The individual amino acids at each binding position of the antibody and the virus respectively, and
 - The effects of the pairwise amino acid interactions between the antibody and the virus.

Bi-Linear Energy Score Model

$$\begin{aligned} Z(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{v}) = & \sum_{i=1}^{N_a} \sum_{j=1}^M x_{ij} a_{ij} + \sum_{i=1}^{N_v} \sum_{j=1}^M y_{ij} v_{ij} \\ & + \sum_{k=1}^{N_a} \sum_{l=1}^{N_v} \sum_{u=1}^M \sum_{m=1}^M a_{ku} q_{kl}^{um} v_{lm} + I \end{aligned}$$

- N_a and N_v : number of binding sites on \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{v} , $M = 20$
- a_{ij}, v_{ij} : binary variables, 1 if position i has amino acid j
0 otherwise
- x_{ij}, y_{ij}, q_{kl} : associated weights for each position/amino acid on the antibody and virus side respectively, and every pairwise interacting positions
- I : intercept

ILP for Virus Objective

- Evade the antibody a through a series of mutations (l_0 distance) from native (initial) virus \mathbf{c} (T sequences)

$$\text{maximize}_{\mathbf{v}^t \in \mathcal{V}} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathcal{Z}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{v}^t) \quad \text{Z-score: bi-linear}$$

$$\text{subject to } \|\mathbf{v}^t - \mathbf{c}^t\|_0 = \alpha, \forall t.$$


MILP for Antibody Objective

- We relax the integrality constraint of the inner (virus escape) problem
 - The LP relaxation of the virus escape ILP has integer optimal solutions
 - The primal relaxed LP is feasible and bounded; therefore, the dual is also feasible and bounded
 - By strong duality, the dual has the same solution as the primal
- We integrate the dual LP into the antibody optimization problem to formulate the MILP

Data

- Antibody sequences
 - Native sequence: VRC23 (anti-HIV broadly neutralizing antibody)
 - 27 binding sites
 - Variants: random substitutions at the binding sites
- Virus sequences
 - Native virus panel: 180 diverse HIV sequences
 - 32 binding sites
 - Variants: random substitutions at the binding sites
- Rosetta structure modeling and energy minimization to compute the Z-scores on 7360 antibody and virus pairs
- Mutation frequencies from the Los Alamos HIV sequence dataset
- We denote the proposed approach as STRONG and the prior approaches as BROAD and AAMAS2015

Simulation Experiments



STRONG vs. BROAD (top row) and STRONG vs. AAMAS2015 (bottom row)
Z-score objective (lower is better) on the 180 native virus panel (left) and the 180 escaping virus set (right)

Conclusions

- We proposed an efficient approach for computational antibody design
 - Using a Stackelberg game model for the interaction between the antibody and the virus
- Our simulation experiments demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms the prior approaches

Thank you